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Abstract—Microprobing is an attack technique against inte-
grated circuits implementing security functions, such as OTP
tokens or smartcards. It allows intercepting secrets from on-
chip wires as well as injecting faults for other attacks. While
the necessity to etch open chip packages and to remove the
passivation layer makes microprobing appear expensive, it was
shown that a successful attack can be run with equipment
worth a few thousand euros. On the protector’s side, however,
appropriate countermeasures such as active shields, redundancy
of core components, or analog detection circuits containing large
capacitors, are still expensive.
We present a resource efficient microbing detection circuit that
we call Low Area Probing Detector (LAPD). It measures minimal
timing differences between on-chip wires caused by the capacitive
load of microprobes. Simulations show that it can detect up-to-
date probes with capacitances as low as 10 fF. As a novelty,
the LAPD is merely based on digital components and does not
require analog circuitry, which reduces the required area and
process steps compared to previous approaches.
Index Terms—Digital Integrated Circuits; Security; Smart
Cards; Data Buses; Microprobing; Invasive Attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
Microprobing is one of the most dangerous attacks that can
be carried out on a secure chip. Its purpose is to violate the
tamper-resistance characteristics of a chip. Despite its higher
cost compared to other types of attacks, it has the advantage
to achieve direct reading of internal data or writing on control
signals. Furthermore, attackers can use microprobing to ma-
nipulate the behavior of an attacked chip by forcing on-chip
wires to arbitrary voltages. [1]
When the reading of data is the objective, buses are a more
interesting target than memory cells because on buses, all
relevant data passes through a few single lines. Worse than
that, buses are difficult to hide in lower metal layers due to
their extension [2].
Since years ago, buses and other chip structures have been
protected by different means like active/passive shields and
other check mechanisms. Shields are top layers of metal that
usually cover the whole surface of the chip [3]. Planarization
and a dense mesh of conductive routes complicate the access
to lower layers of it. In active shields, routes are periodically
tested to detect breaks in them [4].
The performance improvement and accessibility of special-
ized laboratory equipment, from micropositioners over high-
end optical and electron microscopes up to Focused Ion Beams
(FIBs) has put in danger protection measures like shields. FIBs
can drill holes with the necessary depth between meanders of
metal routes which access underlying lines of interest without
damaging the shield. Later on, they can deposit conductive
material to route initially inaccessible signals to the surface,
which allows the right alignment and contact of microprobes
[5].
The aggregation of impediments against these attacks has
forced attackers to search for other easier alternatives. Access
through the backside of the chip has been recently investi-
gated. Using the photonic emission of transistors, a mapping
of transistors is elaborated and regions of interest located
[6]. Then, the backside is thinned down close to transistors,
approximately 50µm, and thereafter FIB machine edition
completes the access to source and drain of the target ones.
As formerly described, ad hoc metal contacts are added to
ease the microprobe contacts [7]. In such a way, buses can
be accessed too by locating the driving buffers, which usually
produce larger photo-emission.
In this paper, a methodology to protect the lines of buses
from the inside of itself is presented. It is based on the fact
that the timing behavior of bus lines is mutually similar under
normal conditions, while attaching a microprobe to some lines
makes this significantly different.
In [8], a Probe Attempt Detector (PAD) was presented
which is able to react when the tip of a microprobe is doing
contact with a bus line. The advantage of the circuit is its dif-
ferential behavior, autonomous operation and high sensitivity.
Essentially, the PAD compares the delay differences between
the bus lines and a digital word is produced according to the
maximum delay difference existing between neighboring lines.
Its limitations are the use of non-standard cell elements and
its area requirement. Because the core of the PAD is analog, it
needs to be designed at a transistor level using structures that
do not exist in standard cell libraries. Additionally, in order
to increase the sensitivity, an integration module is included
that uses a large tank capacitor demanding a significant area
amount.
In this paper, a Low Area Probing Detector (LAPD) is pre-
sented which is implemented only using digital standard cells
and achieves a sensitivity degree in the order of magnitude of
the present commercial microprobes [9]. Owing to the digital
scheme, the area requirement is much lower than the PAD
as no analog components such as capacitors are required. In
addition, the LAPD allows detecting probes in a single shot,
while the PAD is slower and consumes more energy as it
requires counting clock ticks of a ring oscillator.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
II the statement of the problem is formally presented. In
Section III the LAPD is explained in detail and in Section
IV simulation results are shown. Finally concluding remarks
are presented in Section V.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider an on-chip bus transmitting sensitive data that
consists of n lines, to some of which an attacker can contact
microprobes. Also assume that the test bench is static, i.e. the
probes are not moved while the attacked chip is powered up.
The cost of an attacker faced with the need to contact k lines
instead of one may appear linear in the first place – he needs to
have access to k microprobes, micropositioners, amplifiers and
other equipment. However, we assume it is more than linear,
as he will also face additional and presumably time consuming
practical challenges: the more probes are required, the more
likely it is that different needles obstruct each other’s way.
Furthermore, it is difficult to position many micropositioners
around the chip as they are orders of magnitude larger than
the chip itself.
In order to minimize the harm of the information leakage
by the bus, two possible strategies could be selected: the
encryption of the data transmitted through the bus or the
detection of the microprobe presence by electrical means. The
first strategy needs very high resources in terms of chip area,
power consumption and computation time, as well as price
for certification. This is mainly used for the protection of
high-value targets such as Pay TV smartcards [10], [11]. It
is, however, not feasible for mass-market low performance
processors – for example, SIM cards or RFID based public
transport tickets – while the second strategy can be imple-
mented at a vastly reduced cost in terms of area and power
consumption. We focus on the latter case because we target
low-cost secure chips.
The detection of the microprobe presence could be per-
formed online, while data is transmitted through the bus, or
offline, at time instants when the bus is idle. Like before,
the online mode will typically require more power because
it will be in continuous operation while the offline mode will
consume power only during its activation. For this reason, the
selected mode is the offline mode.
In conclusion, the LAPD presented in this paper is of type
offline detector of microprobe presence by electrical means.
Since the test bench is assumed static, typically a detection
run must be performed after reset and/or in bus idle cycles
before critical data is transfered over the bus.
III. THE LOW AREA PROBING DETECTOR
Attaching a microprobe to a bus line increases its capacitive
load. Different capacitive loads of equally sized lines lead to
different delays of these lines. We present the Low Area Prob-
ing Detector (LAPD) that detects microprobing by observing
the timing differences between two or more adjacent bus lines.
This increases the complexity of a microprobing attack: If n
lines are protected by the LAPD, n−1 microprobe connections
can be detected such that the adversary would need to attach
the same capacitive load to all n protected lines. We assume
to protect buses consisting of lines with similar dimensions
and delays.
In order to achieve the maximum level of security, the
LAPD shall protect all lines that either transfer sensitive
information or can be used for forcing or fault injection. This
work is focused on the protection of bus lines on a security
microcontroller: they transfer sensitive information between
different components on the chip and they are easy targets as
they are presumably situated on the top metal layers due to
the distance they need to cross. Furthermore, their structure is
well suitable for our symmetry assumptions that are used for
this work. Alternatively, the LAPD can be used to enhance the
security of active shields such that they do not only evaluate
the existence of proper connections, but also validate their
timing behavior [2].
A. Principle of Operation
The LAPD protects a set of bus lines in a system, as shown
in Figure 1 for the example case of two lines. The lines to be
monitored by the LAPD each have the parasitic capacitance
CL, while an attacker probing a line introduces the additional
capacitance CA, which increases the total capacitance of the
probed line to CL + CA.
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Figure 1. Overview of a System using the LAPD
During the attack, the line capacitances are
C1 = CL + CA (1)
C2 = CL (2)
where C1 is the capacitance of the victim line L1 and C2 is
the capacitance of the reference line L2. Assuming the alpha-
power model for the transistors [12], [13], the delay of the
line buffers can be approximated by
di = k˜
Ci VDD
(VDD − Vt)α (3)
where α is the velocity saturation coefficient of the carriers,
Vt is the threshold voltage of the transistors, k˜ is the trans-
resistance including the remaining transistor parameters, VDD
0
1
1
0
Line L1
Line L2
sel
R
S
Q
Q
tD
tD
Figure 2. Conceptual Schematic of the LAPD Core
the supply voltage and Ci the load of the driving buffer [14].
All technological parameters are balanced between nmos and
pmos transistors. Equation (3), as explained in [14], assumes
that signals approach voltage limits during swinging, which is
the case when signals propagate through chains of gates.
After the attack the delay difference between lines L1 and
L2 is
d1 − d2 = k˜ (C1 − C2)VDD
(VDD − Vt)α = Ω CA (4)
with
Ω = k˜
VDD
(VDD − Vt)α (5)
As shown in (4), the delay difference is, in a first ap-
proximation, proportional to the amount of capacitance of the
microprobe. This relationship is valid for small values of CA
which is the characteristic property of advanced microprobes.
For probes with larger CA, Equation (4) tends to a saturation
but in any case the increase of delay function is monotonic
and therefore we expect the circuit to behave reliably.
The LAPD detects this delay difference by evaluating race
conditions between the two inputs of an RS latch, as shown
in Figure 2. A clock signal drives lines L1 and L2, while a
control logic alternates inserting intentional delays tD in the
end of these lines and before the R and the S input, such that
the latch output shall alternate between 0 and 1 every cycle.
It is preferrable that the clock is not externally accessible to
avoid attacks such as glitching. The delay tD is chosen such
that its value is above the intrinsic timing jitter between the
R and S inputs and below the minimum timing delay that is
expected to be introduced by the microprobe.
B. The LAPD Architecture
The LAPD is based on the timing behavior of a standard
Reset-Set (RS) latch, as depicted in Figure 3(a) for the
NOR implementation. The Basic Concept section explains the
most basic case protecting two lines, Control and Evaluation
Logic describes the components required for operation, and
Protection of n Lines explains how to protect more than two
lines.
1) Basic Concept: An RS latch, as composed of two NOR
or NAND gates, is a memory cell that can be set by activating
the S input and reset by activating the R input. As shown in
Figure 3(b) for NOR RS latches, Q does not match not(Q)
during the time that R and S are active simulaneously – in
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other words, the output is inconsistent. However, as soon as
the first of the two inputs returns to the inactive state, the other,
still active input “wins the race” and the output becomes valid
again.
The LAPD makes use of this behavior by providing both R
and S with a square wave, e.g., a clock signal, where one of the
R and S lines is alternately delayed. For our assumed case of
balanced lines, the latch output Q will alternate between 0 and
1 every clock cycle if no probe is attached. The switchable
delay driver is dimensioned to be smaller than the delay
introduced by the target microprobe: If an adversary attaches
such a probe, it will constantly delay one of the lines beyond
the other line, such that Q will stop alternating and give a
constant output of 0 or 1, depending on the line that is probed.
The timing of the LAPD is shown in Figure 4. The in-
consistent output state of the latch is denoted “X”, and an
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Figure 6. Redundant LAPD Evaluation Logic
unknown output state is denoted “?”. Figure 4(a) shows its
regular operation without any probe attached to L1 or L2.
Inputs R and S are alternately delayed such that Q alternates
between 0 and 1 at the sampling time every clock cycle. In
Figure 4(b), L1 is probed, which induces an additional delay
to R. In this case, R is always slower than S, such that Q stops
alternating and keeps a constant value of 0.
2) Control and Evaluation Logic: The control logic pro-
vides the multiplexer input sel to the LAPD. sel controls
whether latch input R or S shall be delayed.
Figure 5 depicts a schematic of a sample control logic
implementation. It is designed such that sel is generated by
a toggle flip-flop clocked by a delayed, inverted clock signal.
The rising edge of the T flip-flop clock ff_clk shall occur
after the falling edge of the delayed LAPD latch input. An
additional delay tA ensures this condition.
On the output side of the latch, the evaluation logic shall
provide feedback about the absence or presence of a probe.
Conceptually, this is a PASS/FAIL signal where PASS means
that Q toggles every cycle and FAIL indicates that Q remains
at a constant value over two subsequent cycles. Implementing
a single PASS/FAIL output line is dangerous, though: if an
attacker would force such a line to a constant PASS, for
example by the means of a second microbe, the LAPD would
become obsolete.
The circuit as provided in Figure 6 has two redundant
outputs pass and fail to avoid this single point of failure.
It is fed by the signals Q and Q and uses the clock ff_clk
coming from the control logic. As a positive side effect of the
symmetry of the evaluation logic, both outputs of the LAPD
latch are equally loaded, which avoids introducing a bias to
the circuit.
3) Protection of Multiple Lines: So far, only the protection
of two lines has been discussed. In order to protect a bus,
it is necessary to extend the scheme to the protection of n
symmetric bus lines.
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Figure 7. Bus protected by the LAPD
Using “switches” such as pass transistors, transmission gates
or a combination of AND and OR gates, n lines can be
protected by connecting n/2 lines to the L1 input of the LAPD
through such a gate, while connecting the other half to L2.
Then, several delay comparisons are performed such that for
each comparison, one of the bus lines is passed through to L1
and one other bus line is passed through to L2. A schematic is
depicted in Figure 7. With this approach, the LAPD protecting
an n bit bus can detect up to n− 1 attached probes.
A full probe detection coverage is obtained by verifying that
the delays of all bus lines are equal. Due to the transitivity of
equality, it is sufficient to perform a pairwise comparison of
adjacent lines.
In practice, the length of bus lines is not exactly balanced
and therefore, the comparison of two adjacent lines is assumed
to be slightly biased. In the case this bias has a magnitude that
affects the measurement accuracy, it can be compensated by
fine-tuning the individual line delays tD: Instead of having
one constant delay tD for all bus lines, an individual tDi can
be used for each bus line.
C. System Integration Example
Given that the LAPD can take over control of the bus for a
limited time, it can be attached to the bus of a microprocessor
system just like any peripheral component. The CPU core can
trigger a probe detection run, for example, by a read operation
to the LAPD which would give the LAPD full access to the
data bus until the LAPD signals the end of the read operation.
A probe detection run can be triggered during startup or
prior to transferring critical information such as keys over the
bus.
A top-level view of the LAPD integration into a low-power
smartcard chip is shown in Figure 8.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We simulated the function of the LAPD on a STMicroelec-
tronics 65nm technology using standard cells in the Cadence
environment with spectre.
We aimed at obtaining the dependency between the delay
tD and the minimum capacity CA,min that can be detected.
From that, the delay tD shall be determined.
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Figure 8. LAPD System Integration
The dependency between tD and CA,min is determined by
simulating a system as shown in Figure 1. For reasons of
simplicity, the control logic is replaced by manually driving
the sel input, while the evaluation logic is implemented in
software that uses the spectre analog waveforms of Q as input
data. Due to the symmetry of the RS latch, it is sufficient
to simulate probing the line that is connected to the L2
input of the LAPD. We assume probe capacitance values
of CA ∈ {0 fF, 5 fF, 10 fF, · · · , 60 fF}. The LAPD itself is
implemented according to Figure 2, but allows keeping the
delay tD variable. As an obvervation window, we chose values
between 10 ps and 300 ps. Considering the line capacitance
CL, we assumed a value of 100 fF.
Table I shows CA,min in dependency of the delay tD. A
graphical representation of the detection coverage of probe
attachments is shown in Figure 9. The x axis points out
the configured delay tD of the delay gate, while the y axis
denotes the capacitance CA of the attached probe. Blue circles
point out undetected capacitive loads, which means that the
detector output still behaves as normal, while white circles
denote the successful detection of a probe attachment – on a
technical level, this means that the LAPD outputs Q and Q stop
alternating and keep at a constant value. From this figure, 10
fF can be spotted as the minimal value of CA to be detected.
The microprobe with the smallest input capacitance we found
on the market [9] has an input capacitance value of at least
20 fF and therefore could be detected by the LAPD.
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Figure 9. Nominal LAPD Detection Coverage
tD in ps CA,min in fF
10 5
20 5
30 5
40 5
50 10
60 10
70 10
80 15
90 15
100 15
110 20
120 20
130 20
140 20
150 25
tD in ps CA,min in fF
160 25
170 25
180 30
190 30
200 30
210 35
220 35
230 35
240 35
250 40
260 40
270 40
280 45
290 45
300 45
Table I
MINIMUM DETECTED CA DEPENDING ON tD
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present the Low Area Probing Detector
(LAPD), a new approach to detect microprobing on symmetric
lines such as buses. It is the first detector measuring capaci-
tances to detect tampering without relying on analog circuitry.
This avoids large analog components, which makes the area
required for the LAPD circuitry lower than for any other delay-
based probe detection scheme.
According to our simulations, the LAPD detects state-of-
the-art active microprobes with parasitic capatitances of 20 fF
or less.
The scheme can be used to enhance the security of low-cost
security controllers, as found on cheap mass market products
such as SIM cards, but it is also possible to apply its concepts
to improve the security of – already well-protected – high end
security controllers, as they are found in Pay TV smart cards,
for example.
As the LAPD increases the complexity for a successful bus
attack, adversaries continue to look for other attack vectors.
For an effective and comprehensive protection of security
chips, other components need to be protected as well – this
includes, for example, memory controllers, address decoders,
control logic and arithmetic-logic units (ALUs), but also
the signalling mechanisms of attack detectors themselves.
Therefore, analyzing other microprobing attack targets and
providing appropiate protection mechanisms appears as an
important field for further work.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was partly funded by the Spanish research
program TEC2010-18384 as well as by the German Federal
Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) in the project
SIBASE through grant number 01S13020A.
REFERENCES
[1] O. Ko¨mmerling and M. G. Kuhn, “Design Principles for Tamper-
resistant Smartcard Processors,” in Proceedings of the USENIX
Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on
Smartcard Technology, ser. WOST’99. Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX
Association, 1999, pp. 2–2. [Online]. Available: http://dl.acm.org/
citation.cfm?id=1267115.1267117
[2] P. Maier and K. Nohl, “Low-Cost Chip Micro-
probing,” 29th Chaos Communication Congress (29C3),
12 2012, accessed on 2014-01-16. [Online]. Avail-
able: http://events.ccc.de/congress/2012/Fahrplan/attachments/2247
29C3-Dexter Nohl-Low Cost Chip Microprobing.pdf
[3] R. Anderson, M. Bond, J. Clulow, and S. Skorobogatov, “Cryptographic
Processors-A Survey,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 94, no. 2, pp. 357–
369, 2006.
[4] M. Ling, L. Wu, X. Li, X. Zhang, J. Hou, and Y. Wang, “Design of
Monitor and Protect Circuits against FIB Attack on Chip Security,” in
Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS), 2012 Eighth Interna-
tional Conference on, 2012, pp. 530–533.
[5] C. Tarnovsky, “Deconstructing a ’Secure’ Processor,” Blackhat DC,
2012.
[6] J. Kra¨mer, D. Nedospasov, A. Schlo¨sser, and J.-P. Seifert, “Differential
Photonic Emission Analysis,” in Constructive Side-Channel Analysis
and Secure Design, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, E. Prouff,
Ed. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013, vol. 7864, pp. 1–16. [Online].
Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40026-1 1
[7] C. Helfmeier, D. Nedospasov, C. Tarnovsky, J. Krissler, C. Boit, and J.-P.
Seifert, “Breaking and Entering Through the Silicon,” in Proceedings of
the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, ser. CCS ’13. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2013, pp. 733–744.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2508859.2516717
[8] S. Manich, M. S. Wamser, and G. Sigl, “Detection of Probing Attempts
in Secure ICs,” in Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2012,
pp. 134–139.
[9] “Picoprobe Model 18C & Picoprobe Model 19C,” Datasheet, accessed
on 2014-01-16. [Online]. Available: http://www.ggb.com/PdfIndex
files/mod18c.pdf
[10] H.-U. Buchmu¨ller, “Security Target M7820 A11 and M11,” August
2012, accessed on 2014-01-16. [Online]. Available: http://www.
commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/0829b pdf.pdf
[11] “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
3: Security assurance components,” 2012, https://www.niap-ccevs.org/
Documents and Guidance/cc docs.cfm, accessed on 25.08.2013.
[12] T. Sakurai and A. R. Newton, “Alpha-power law MOSFET model and its
applications to CMOS inverter delay and other formulas,” IEEE Journal
of Solid-State Circuits, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 584–594, 1990.
[13] K. A. Bowman, B. L. Austin, J. C. Eble, X. Tang, and J. D. Meindl,
“A Physical Alpha-power Law MOSFET Model,” in Proceedings of the
1999 International Symposium on Low Power Electronics and Design,
ser. ISLPED ’99. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 1999, pp. 218–222.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/313817.313930
[14] A. Balankutty, T. C. Chih, C. Y. Chen, and P. Kinget, “Mismatch
Characterization of Ring Oscillators,” in Custom Integrated Circuits
Conference, 2007. CICC ’07. IEEE, 2007, pp. 515–518.
